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The Return to and Expansion of Escobedo
ABSTRACT
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States set out to correct the
problems in America’s criminal justice system by creating procedural safeguards in a ground-breaking case: Miranda v. Arizona. These safeguards
were created to protect innocent citizens from the psychological pressures
and interrogation techniques used by police. However, these intended protections have failed. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have continued to rip
apart Miranda’s procedural safeguards by placing a multitude of limitations on the doctrine, causing legal scholars everywhere to question Miranda’s effectiveness. This Comment explores both the history of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments and the foundational cases that Miranda was based
upon. Additionally, this Comment will assess the subsequent limitations
placed on Miranda itself and how those limitations have created “holes”
for law enforcement to work through during interrogations. Lastly, this
Comment will look at previous scholars’ arguments on “fixing” Miranda
and proposes that the Court should revert to and extend Escobedo v. Illinois
in order for Miranda’s intended protections to be successfully carried out.
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INTRODUCTION
A common question that many people have likely heard before is,
“why would someone who is innocent confess to a crime that they did not
commit?” The reasonable person believes that those who admit to a crime
actually committed it, but that is not always the case. Since the emergence
of DNA exonerations in 1989, twenty-nine percent of the 375 DNA exonerees involved false confessions.1 The answer to the preceding question
is that standard police interrogation techniques, combined with psychological pressures, can easily cause an innocent person to confess. Throughout
history, many have come to question our criminal justice system regarding
whether it is just or fair, poring over what can be done to protect the innocent. The Supreme Court of the United States attempted to take on these
problems in 1966 by creating procedural safeguards in Miranda v. Arizona
to protect the innocent. However, subsequent years have led many to ask
whether Miranda v. Arizona was successful in achieving its intended protections, or has the Court’s post-Miranda limitations caused Miranda to fail
miserably?
In July 2002, Karen Boes, a mother of two, had her life turned upside
down. Shortly thereafter, she was able to answer that burning question:
Miranda has failed miserably.
On July 30, 2002, Karen left her home in Zeeland, Michigan, early in
the morning to go shopping with a friend.2 While waiting for the store to
open, she received a phone call alerting her that her house was on fire;
knowing that her daughter was asleep when she left, she raced home only
to learn that her daughter died in the fire.3 The next thing Karen knew, she
was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for killing her daughter.4
1. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/B6GX-PVYU].
2. John Agar, Karen Boes Falsely Confessed to Daughter’s Killing: Netflix Documentary, M LIVE (Jan. 19, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/2017/09/
karen_boes_falsely_confessed_t.html [https://perma.cc/QH6X-C4QX].
3. FREE KAREN BOES, https://freekarenboes.com/ [https://perma.cc/A32X-2WLM].
4. Id.
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Karen’s story begins a week after the fire when she voluntarily went
to police in an attempt to figure out how her daughter died.5 Karen spent
eleven and a half hours at the Zeeland Police Station and, during that time,
she was subjected to a tag-team interview by law enforcement.6 After the
original interview, police subjected Karen to multiple interviews over a
six-week period where officers became increasingly confrontational and began lying about evidence they had against her.7 Over the six weeks of interviews, minor contradictions in her statements began to emerge, and she
started second guessing her memory.8 The interviews and tactics utilized
by police led Karen not to expressly confess her guilt to the crime, but to
say she could possibly have done it when she was not “in her right mind or
in an unconscious state.”9 Her equivocal statement led Karen to spend the
last eighteen years in prison without hope of ever being released unless the
governor of Michigan grants clemency or a pardon.10
Karen is not the only person to recognize that the procedural safeguards created in Miranda have failed miserably. In previous years, many
scholars have questioned the Court’s decision in Miranda and the limitations placed on the Miranda decision in the years after. Many have argued
for different ways to correct Miranda so that it fulfills the Court’s expectations of protecting the innocent; however, these different approaches to correct the famous decision are not enough. The purposes of this Comment are
to (1) propose a return to the previous framework created in Escobedo v.
Illinois; (2) right the wrongs created by subsequent limitations on invoking
criminal suspect’s rights; and (3) protect the innocent from false confessions.
Part I of this Comment will explore the history of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and the cases leading to Miranda, including both Escobedo
and Miranda. Part II discusses the limitations created by the Court after
their decision in Miranda and reviews the limitations created within the Miranda decision. Part III analyzes how the limitations discussed in Part II
leave open the possibility to extract false confessions from innocent individuals. Lastly, Part IV addresses previous scholars’ arguments for correcting Miranda and proposes a return to the framework created by the Court
under Escobedo.
5. Agar, supra note 2.
6. FREE KAREN BOES, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (noting that at the time the source was last updated, Karen Boes had spent fourteen years in prison).
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I. THE ROAD TO MIRANDA AND ITS CREATION
A. The Path that Led to Miranda v. Arizona
Miranda v. Arizona held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination bars the admission of involuntary confessions obtained
during custodial interrogation.11 It also created the well-known “Miranda
Warnings” as procedural safeguards to help courts determine whether a confession was voluntary or not.12 Of these warnings, one in particular, “he has
the right to the presence of an attorney,”13 acknowledges a Fifth Amendment right to counsel to help protect a person against the inherently coercive
atmosphere of an interrogation room.14 However, there is no Fifth Amendment right to counsel.15 A careful reading of Miranda demonstrates that the
majority took the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and applied it to custodial interrogation by police.16 Exploring the establishment of the privilege against self-incrimination, along with the cases leading up to Miranda,
is important to understand how the Court reached its holding.
1. Establishment of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall . . . be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”17 These words represent
the privilege against self-incrimination and extend back to the fourth century during the “medieval controversies between the English king and the
[Roman Catholic] church.”18 The medieval days of England saw two systems of justice: the Church’s inquisitorial system and the accusatorial system of England.19 The former values the search for truth above an innocent
person’s rights; the latter exalts the opposite by placing the rights of the
innocent above all else.20 The accusatorial system is exemplified by a fifteenth-century Chief Justice, Sir John Fortescue: “[o]ne would much rather
that twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death, than that

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966).
Id. at 479.
Id.
See id. at 467–78.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
DAVID J. BODENHAMER, OUR RIGHTS 155 (2007).
Id.
Id.
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one innocent person should be condemned, and suffer capitally.”21 The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a shift in the English practice; instead
of protecting the innocent, the Star Chamber22 favored “[s]ecret proceedings
and torture.”23 The Star Chamber, along with other courts in England, favored ex-officio proceedings where people were forced to take an oath
known as the “ex-officio oath” or forced to speak the truth and confess their
guilt.24
The privilege not to incriminate oneself originated in England during
the rebellion against the system and procedure during the trial of John Lilburn.25 John refused to take the ex-officio oath or to answer against himself;
“hundreds of others [also] refused to be sworn, or being sworn, refused to
answer.”26 In response to Lilburn’s heroism for his defense to liberty, Parliament abolished the Star Chamber in 1641.27 When coming to America
from England, the American colonists knew of this “history of royal
abuse . . . and they brought with them a firm conviction that no man should
be required to testify against or accuse himself.”28 In all the American colonies, “justice was to be administered as closely as possible ‘to the common
law of England,’”29 and the colonists considered the privilege against
self-incrimination to be a part of their rights under the common law.30 Eventually, it became the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.31

21. Id.
22. Star Chamber, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining Star Chamber)
(“An English court having broad civil and criminal jurisdiction at the king’s discretion and
noted for its secretive, arbitrary, and oppressive procedures[.]”).
23. BODENHAMER, supra note 18, at 155; see also Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive
Power and the Demise of the Star Chamber, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 330 (2010) (noting
that Parliament abolished the Star Chamber because (1) it overreached its jurisdiction under
the law, (2) its proceedings were arbitrary, resulting in false convictions, and (3) it inflicted
cruel and unusual punishments on the guilty).
24. R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 770 (1935).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. BODENHAMER, supra note 188, at 156.
28. Id.
29. Pittman, supra note 244, at 766.
30. BODENHAMER, supra note 22, at 156 (“In 1641, for example, the Massachusetts Puritans included prohibitions against torture and self-incriminating oaths in their earliest law
code . . . By the time of the Revolution, these protections were considered to be so essential
to liberty that they appeared in various state constitutions[.]”).
31. Id.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, confessions that were the product
of violence or trickery by officials were excluded by the courts, but confessions obtained using deception and psychological pressure by outside
sources were admitted.32 Confessions were admissible if they were made
voluntarily, which was determined using a broad standard that was easily
satisfied as long as there was no evidence of threats.33 Courts during this
time aspired to create an “efficient system of justice” and subsequently extended the privilege against self-incrimination to civil cases that could lead
to criminal prosecution in federal cases.34 While the Court understood the
privilege to be a “wise and beneficent rule of evidence,” they did not see it
as an essential part of due process. Therefore, the Court allowed states to
set their own standards even if that meant “order and national security
trumped the rights of individuals to remain silent.”35
2. The Amendments and Their Effects on the Court’s Decisions in the
Cases Leading to Miranda
Before the Court decided that the privilege against self-incrimination
was essential under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in
1964, the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states.36 Miranda’s predecessors were decided under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It
is important to analyze the cases preceding Miranda to understand how the
Court used those cases to create the procedural safeguards famously known
as Miranda Warnings.
Between the 1930s and 1970s, the Court heard many cases dealing
with the constitutionality of confessions obtained by law enforcement and
held that they were inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process voluntariness test.37 In the 1932 landmark case of Powell v. Alabama, also known as the “first ‘modern’ procedural due process case,” the
Court established the constitutional principle of the right to counsel under
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 157.
36. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 422 (2019 ed. 2019); see also Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (discussing the admissibility of confessions in state or federal
court) (“[T]he issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, commanding that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” (internal citation omitted)).
37. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1940) (holding that confessions
obtained through violence were inadmissible).
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the Due Process Clause.38 In Powell, nine young defendants were arrested,
arraigned, and never asked whether they were able to employ counsel or if
they wished to appoint counsel.39 They subsequently pleaded not guilty and
were indicted for rape on the same day.40 Prior to trial, the judge had “appointed all the members of the bar for the purpose of arraigning the defendants and then [assumed] the members of the bar would continue to [represent them at trial] if no new counsel appeared.”41 This subsequently led to
no lawyer being named until the morning of the trial.42 In the majority’s
opinion, the Court emphasized that the defendants were not “afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of [their] own choice” during the most critical
period of proceedings: the pretrial-preparation period.43 In the last few
pages of the opinion, the Court went on to explain that the trial court’s failure to give defendants “reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel,”
equated to a clear violation of due process.44 The Court then presented a
limited statement about the right to counsel in state criminal cases:
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital
case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of
law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case . . . . In a case such as this, . . . the right to have
counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.45

Four years after Powell, the Court decided its first Fourteenth Amendment Due Process confession case in Brown v. Mississippi.46 Here, three
African American defendants were beaten, whipped, and one defendant was
even hung from a tree, until they all confessed as demanded by the deputy

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 363.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49–52 (1932).
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 71–72.
ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 399.
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sheriff.47 The Court held that the confessions that had been obtained
through physical coercion violated suspects’ fundamental rights and constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48
It reasoned that the Due Process Clause required that the treatment of suspects “be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”49
In Brown, the Court made it clear that the case was not decided under
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination: “The State is
free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy.”50 However, if doing so “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental,” then they are not free to do so.51
As the Court’s rationale in coerced confession cases evolved, it became clear that the due process voluntariness test was not very helpful in
deciding the admissibility of confessions—it appeared the test was more
conclusory than analytical. The totality of the circumstances test encompassed so many different factors to the point that everything was relevant,
but no single factor was decisive. A shift in the constitutional atmosphere
encouraged Supreme Court Justices to begin viewing access to a lawyer as
fundamental to protecting defendants during police interrogations. In the
unanimous 1959 case Spano v. New York, although ultimately decided on
other grounds, it appeared as though a majority of the Court would support
the contention that a person’s constitutional right to counsel begins once
that person is formally indicted.52 The five like-minded Justices took this
position, and in two separate opinions, the Justices emphasized that Spano
was not a case where police were questioning a suspect in secret interrogations, but rather a case where the person had been formally charged with a
crime following an indictment.53 While a majority of the Court viewed the
case this way, Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion did not decide the
47. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936).
48. See id. at 285–86.
49. Id. at 286.
50. Id. at 285.
51. Id. (first quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); and then citing
Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905)).
52. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
53. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324–26 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[H]ere we deal not with
a suspect but with a man who has been formally charged with a crime.” (citing Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958))); id. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Let it be emphasized
at the outset that this is not a case where the police were questioning a suspect in the course
of investigating an unsolved crime. When the petitioner surrendered to the New York authorities he was under indictment for first degree murder.” (citations omitted)).
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case on the grounds suggested by the concurring Justices. Instead, he found
the confession to be inadmissible under the due process voluntariness test
and the totality of the circumstances test.54
About four years after Spano, the Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright
that every person accused of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to
a lawyer at trial.55 A little over a year after the Gideon decision, the Court
extended the Sixth Amendment right to an attorney to individuals subjected
to pretrial interrogation in Massiah v. United States.56 The Court took the
view of the concurring Justices in Spano and the majority in Powell, holding
“the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there
was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been
indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”57 Massiah provided the foundation for the Court’s future decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.
3. Escobedo v. Illinois
By requiring states to provide lawyers, the Justices came to understand
that “the Court could create a frontline agency for supervising police practices and [that] would be more effective than the exclusionary rule” in
achieving its objectives.58 Less than one month after Massiah, the Court
incorporated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
making it applicable to the states.59 About a week later, in Escobedo, it
decided that an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was necessary
to protect that privilege in the period prior to indictment.60
In the early hours of January 20, 1960, defendant Escobedo was arrested for the murder of his brother-in-law.61 Escobedo was interrogated
for over twelve hours, refused to make a statement, and was subsequently
released later that day under a state court writ of habeas corpus obtained by
his lawyer, Mr. Wolfson.62 About ten days later, Escobedo was arrested
and, on the way to the police station, informed by the police that
54. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 321–24.
55. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–44 (1963).
56. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204–05 (1964).
57. Id. at 206 (dealing with a petitioner whose incriminating statements were secretly
recorded by a codefendant outside of the police station after petitioner was indicted and released on bail).
58. LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 386–87 (2000).
59. Malloy v. Hogan 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
60. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
61. Id. at 479.
62. Id.
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DiGerlando—another suspect already in police custody— “had named him
as the one who shot” the deceased.63 Escobedo responded by asking to
speak with his lawyer.64
During Escobedo’s interrogation by police, he repeatedly asked to
speak to his lawyer but was denied because his lawyer “didn’t want to see”
him.65 In reality, his lawyer was actually at the police station asking to see
Escobedo, but the police refused his requests as well.66 While in the course
of interrogation, officers confronted Escobedo with DiGerlando while Escobedo was suffering from sleep deprivation; eventually, he told DiGerlando, “I didn’t shoot Manuel, you did it.”67 Officers believed that the previous statement was Escobedo admitting to some knowledge of the crime.68
After further statements implicating himself in the murder plot, the prosecutor was summoned to take a statement.69 The Supreme Court of Illinois
determined that the refusal to permit Escobedo to speak with his lawyer did
not change the fact that he voluntarily confessed to murder.70
From these facts, the Supreme Court of the United States was left to
decide whether Escobedo was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
when the police refused his requests to speak with his lawyer.71 In reaching
its holding, the Court primarily focused its analysis on three prior decisions:
Powell, Spano, and Massiah. From these cases, the Court held that Escobedo was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel—even though he
had yet to be formally charged—because the purpose of the interrogation
was to have him confess and obtain a conviction.72
This holding is significant because the Court extended the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to include the time between the arrest and indictment. In their decision, the Court addressed the argument that extending
the right to counsel prior to a formal indictment would diminish the number
of confessions obtained by police. According to the Court, the argument
“cuts two ways.”73 The Court reasoned that the time between the arrest and
the indictment is the time when most confessions are obtained by police,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 482–83.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 488.
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and if a person were to go without the “legal aid and advice” of a lawyer
during this period, having legal representation at trial would be meaningless.74 The Court linked the necessity of counsel’s advice and the newly
incorporated privilege against self-incrimination: “[o]ur Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to
be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination.”75
Escobedo created an analytical framework by stating that the shift from
the investigatory to the accusatory stage is where the adversary system attaches.76 Simply put, under Escobedo, a suspect has the right to be left alone
by the police—and to not be subject to any police interrogation—absent the
presence of their counsel at the moment the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory.77
B. Miranda v. Arizona and its “Protections”
Just two years after Escobedo, the Warren Court issued one of its most
controversial decisions. Miranda became known as the most contentious
criminal procedure decision, prompting twenty-seven states to file an amicus brief “asking the Court to slow down.”78 “Miranda provoked a storm
of opposition from police and prosecution . . . and a spirited defense from
civil rights advocates and the academic community.”79 The decision
“changed the standard by which confessions were deemed voluntary and,
therefore, admissible at trial as part of the prosecution’s case against the
accused.”80 Before getting into the protections created by Miranda, a close
analysis of the case is imperative.
Miranda addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. The cases all had similar issues where “the defendant was questioned
by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. Id.; see also id. at 486 (“Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under
Illinois law an admission of mere complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as
an admission of firing of the fatal shots.” (citation omitted)).
76. Id. at 492 (“[W]hen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins
to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with
his lawyer.”).
77. Id.
78. POWE, supra note 58, at 394.
79. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1988).
80. Mandy DeFilippo, You Have the Right to Better Safeguards: Looking Beyond Miranda in the New Millennium, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 638 (2001).
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he was cut off from the outside world.”81 However, none of the defendants
were “given a full and effective warning of [their] rights at the outset of the
interrogation process.”82 “In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements . . . were admitted at their
trials.”83 In each separate case, the Court held that the statements were inadmissible because there was no evidence showing that “any warnings
[were] given or that any effective alternative ha[d] been employed.”84
The Miranda opinion begins with an endorsement of Escobedo’s application of principles and quotes both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as
they worked together in Escobedo: “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” and “the accused
shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel.”85 While the Court states that it
reaffirms Escobedo, it is clear from the beginning of the opinion that it actually ignores Escobedo in deciding this case.86 The Court is mostly concerned with the privilege against self-incrimination and police interrogation
practices, which is shown through the extensive presentation of the
then-present interrogation practices and procedures in modern police manuals and texts.87 From these manuals, the Court concluded that, absent procedural safeguards, the inherently coercive pressures of police interrogation
had proved overwhelming to individuals’ ability to exercise their right
against self-incrimination and that no confession given under these conditions “can truly be the product of [a suspect’s] free choice.”88 Further, because of this inherently coercive environment, the Court found that “the
right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . .”89
From these concerns, the Court created a four-part procedural safeguard, now known as the Miranda Warnings. The warnings include: (1) the
right to remain silent; (2) anything said can and will be used against the
individual in a court of law; (3) the right to an attorney; and (4) if the

81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
82. Id. at 445.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 492–98.
85. Id. at 442.
86. Id. at 439 (“[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.”).
87. See id. at 448–55.
88. Id. at 457–58.
89. Id. at 469.
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individual cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to him.90 These
warnings were meant to protect the privilege against self-incrimination and
they must be given as soon as a person is “deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.”91 The Court believed that it is at this point when
the formal “adversary system of criminal proceedings commences,”92 and
if a person is not read their rights and subsequently makes incriminating
statements, those statements will be inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment.93 If a person is both subject to interrogation and not read their rights,
the Court will no longer stop to analyze the facts of a case to determine
whether the individual was aware of their rights.94 These rights were created to allow an individual the opportunity to exercise their privilege against
self-incrimination95 and, as expressed by the Court, “[t]he principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police
interrogation . . . .”96 While the Court in 1966 believed that these procedural safeguards would protect and uphold an individual’s constitutional
rights, that simply was not the case in the post-Miranda years.
II. MIRANDA’S LIMITATIONS
Miranda changed the prior constitutional balance between the prosecutor’s interests and the suspect’s interest. Courts can no longer “admit
confessions obtained through custodial interrogations simply because they
were ‘voluntarily given’ under the totality of the circumstances” test.97 Miranda became a compromise between the totality of the circumstances test
and Escobedo’s “implication that there could be no interrogation unless
counsel was present.”98 The compromise provided clear procedures for law
enforcement to follow in pursuit of custodial interrogations producing confessions that would support both the prosecutor’s interest in convicting
90. Id. at 479.
91. Id. at 444.
92. Id. at 477.
93. Id. at 476.
94. Id. at 468.
95. George Blum, Annotation, What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” by Police
Officer Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring That Suspect Be Informed of His or
Her Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation—At Suspect’s or Third
Party’s Residence, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 6th 505 (2007).
96. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
97. Paul G. Ulrich, Miranda v. Arizona: History, Memories, and Perspectives, 7 ARIZ.
SUMMIT L. REV. 203, 212 (2013).
98. POWE, supra note 58, at 398.
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presumably guilty persons and the suspect’s interest in protecting their constitutional rights. However, the post-Miranda years have left many people
asking if the compromise was enough.
A. The Limitations Presented in Miranda v. Arizona
While the Court in Miranda created procedural protections of an accused’s constitutional rights, it also left issues unresolved that subsequent
courts needed to define, such as what amounts to custody, what constitutes
interrogation, and how an individual invokes and waives the rights afforded
by Miranda. First, Miranda limited the procedural protections only to those
who are in custody. This is clearly expressed throughout the decision, but
in particular: “the protection which must be given . . . when the individual
is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”99 The
reason for this limitation, however, was that the Court did not want to “hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime,” so it
only limited the protection to when a person is in custody.100 Unfortunately,
the Court never expressly defined what amounts to custody and left that
issue unresolved for future courts to determine.
The first limitation of only protecting those who are in police custody
leads to Miranda’s second limitation: protection is only afforded to those
who are subject to custodial interrogation. With this limitation, the Court
defined what it meant by custodial interrogation: “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”101 This
limitation leaves vulnerable those who are subjected to general inquiry investigation such as “on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a
crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process . . . .”102 The Court believes that in those situations, the police-dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation is not present.103 What is still
unclear from the Court’s definition of custodial interrogation is what actually amounts to an interrogation and when general questioning becomes an
interrogation that warrants invoking someone’s Miranda rights. Unfortunately, the Court has yet to provide a bright-line rule.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 478.
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The Court in Miranda fully embraced the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
by employing a right to counsel during custodial interrogations to protect a
person’s privilege against self-incrimination, but it completely diminished
its intended protections by allowing a person to waive their rights.104 A
waiver by an individual is valid as long as it was made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”105 Furthermore, the Court never truly defined what
“voluntarily,” “knowingly,” or “intelligently” meant, but it hinted that a
warning is enough to “overcome [the interrogation’s] pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that
point in time.”106 The Court also did not entirely explain how someone can
invoke their rights. One question presented by this limitation is, “[a]t what
point, if any, does a suspect’s silence in the face of police questions constitute an assertion of her right to remain silent?”107 The last limitation on a
suspect’s right is that the Court refused to prohibit free and voluntary statements: “[c]onfessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any
statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence is,
of course, admissible in evidence.”108 Limitations created by the Court
make it easy for police to live within the Miranda compromise once they
understand the different “loopholes.”
B. Limitations Created by the Court Post-Miranda
Since its ruling in Miranda, the Court has created more limitations on
an individual’s constitutional rights based on the language within Miranda.
These post-Miranda decisions help explain whether, and to what extent, the
police can implement successful interrogation strategies.
The Miranda warnings are triggered when an individual is both in custody and interrogated. As previously noted, the Court’s definition of custodial interrogation is: “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”109 Even with the Court defining custodial interrogation, there is still much confusion in the post-Miranda cases
as to its meaning. In Beckwith v. United States, the Court held that being
the focus of an investigation alone does not involve the inherently coercive
104. Id. at 475 (“An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement
and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.”).
105. Id. at 444.
106. Id. at 469.
107. ISRAEL ET. AL., supra note 366, at 445.
108. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
109. Id. at 444.
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pressures of an incommunicado custodial interrogation as described in Miranda.110
If being the focus of an investigation is irrelevant, what matters? When
is a person exposed to the “inherently coercive pressures”111 of an incommunicado custodial interrogation? Since Miranda, the Court has shown that
if a suspect goes to the police station on his own, or voluntarily agrees to go
with the police, police station questioning designed to produce incriminating statements may not be labeled “custodial interrogation.”112 A few years
later, the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, defined interrogation as not only
referring to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police that the police “should have known” are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from a suspect.113
The Court created an objective test for custodial interrogation which
required judges to evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation in Stansbury v. California.114 There, the Court held that the
“initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of
the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”115 A more recent case,
Yarborough v. Alvarado, explains that a suspect is not in custody when there
is an “absence of any intense or aggressive tactics” coupled with a suspect’s
ability to leave after being interviewed.116
When it comes to invoking the Miranda rights, what all is a person
required to do or say? The Court gave a very clear answer to that question
in Davis v. United States. The Court held that an individual who intends to
assert his or her right to have counsel must articulate this “sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”117
110. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976).
111. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).
112. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (discussing when
police questioning is noncustodial) (“[T]here is no indication that the questioning took place
in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way.”); see also
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (“Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is “in
custody” for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495)).
113. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
114. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1994) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 323.
116. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659 (2004).
117. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
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As mentioned previously, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently by the suspect.118 But what does that mean? The
Court explained what voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently means in
Moran v. Burbine:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with
a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.119

In more simple terms, voluntary can be interpreted when a suspect
says, “the police did not make me waive my rights,” and knowing and intelligent can be interpreted from saying, “I know what the Miranda rights
mean and what may happen to me if I talk.”
The cases, as they are previously laid out, show how the Court in Miranda left much to be explained and decided in the post-Miranda years.
They also hint that as time moves on, the Court will continue to interpret
Miranda and invoke new holdings as to the effect Miranda has on modern
law enforcement strategies. But these cases, along with Miranda, leave
open the possibility for false confessions.
III. THE LIMITATIONS LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR FALSE
CONFESSIONS
As previously stated, Miranda warnings were created to combat the
pressures of interrogation and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination.120 However, it is clear that the Warren
Court’s attempt has failed. Miranda narrowly defined custodial interrogations, which leaves individuals that are subjected to non-custodial interviews to fend for their own constitutional rights. Police officers “have adjusted to Miranda by shifting to noncustodial ‘interviews’ to skirt
Miranda’s requirements.”121
118. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
119. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1985) (citations omitted).
120. Blum, supra note 95.
121. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 881 (1996).
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Research has found that many officers refer to giving suspects a “Beheler” warning.122 This is in reference to California v. Beheler, where the
Court held that Miranda warnings were not required where the defendant,
although a suspect, was not placed under arrest, had voluntarily come to the
police station, and was allowed to leave unhindered after a brief interview.123 Accordingly, the Court held Beheler was not taken into custody
and his freedom “was not restricted in any way whatsoever.”124 “Drawn
from this case, the Beheler warning consists of telling a suspect that he is
not under arrest and is free to leave during the ‘interview.’”125 By allowing
these non-custodial interviews, Miranda is not invoked and the individual
being questioned is not given an attorney. Therefore, the inherently coercive, police-dominant atmosphere of an incommunicado custodial interrogation that the Miranda Court was so concerned about provides police officers with the possibility to obtain incriminating statements, false
confessions, and any other statement that is “protected” under Miranda.
Furthermore, the Court’s holding in Innis, in which they defined interrogation as not only referring to express questioning but also to any “words
or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response [from the suspect],”126 can
also lead to false confessions and other incriminating statements. In Innis,
the criminal suspect was arrested and given his Miranda rights after killing
a taxicab driver; he responded by saying he wanted to speak to his lawyer.127
As the petitioner was being driven to the police station, the two officers in
the front of the patrol car conversed with each other concerning the possibility that a handicapped child from the nearby handicapped school would
find the suspect’s gun and harm themself or others.128 Overhearing the conversation, the suspect told the officers to turn the car around so that he could
show them where the gun was located.129 After returning to the scene, he
was read his Miranda rights again and he responded that he understood his
rights but “wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the
area in the school.”130 He then led police to the gun and was subsequently

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam).
Id. at 1123.
Cassell & Hayman, supra note 121, at 882.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).
Id. at 293–94.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 295.
Id.
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indicted for the murder.131 The issue in Innis was whether the suspect was
interrogated. From the Court’s holding, it is clear that police can use trickery to get around an interrogation without it being considered an “interrogation.”
Another way Miranda’s limitations can lead to false confessions is that
Miranda does not require specific language for warnings. In California v.
Prysock, the Court held that the content of Miranda warnings was not required to be a “virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the
Miranda opinion.”132 This subsequently led to the Court holding in Duckworth v. Eagan that the Court requires no more than that “the warnings
‘reasonably convey to a suspect his rights,’ as required by Miranda.”133
This has resulted in many different variations of the warnings which has led
to suspects misunderstanding their rights.134 These misunderstandings have
the possibility to lead to false confessions. For example, if a suspect does
not understand their rights and they waive them, police then may use trickery and deceit to obtain a false confession or any other incriminating statement.
Similar to misunderstanding a suspect’s rights is unambiguously invoking rights. As noted previously, the Davis Court held that an individual
who is intending to assert his or her right to have counsel must articulate
this “sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”135
Generally, custodial interrogation is likely to lead a suspect to express their
wishes to tentatively invoke their rights.136 To put it more simply, custodial
interrogation ambiguously leads a suspect to unsuccessfully invoke their
rights, leading to their statements being admissible in court.
Lastly, the Court in Miranda stated:
[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a
waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive
his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.137

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 355 (1981) (per curiam).
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361).
Janet C. Hoeffel, Miranda’s First Principles, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 113, 129 (2017).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
Hoeffel, supra note 134, at 132–33.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
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Post-Miranda cases have metaphorically “killed” this assertion because courts have generally been reluctant to find involuntary waivers in
cases where police misrepresented or exaggerated the evidence against a
suspect. A prime example is United States v. Velasquez. There, officers
misrepresented the strength of the case against the suspect by falsely informing her that a co-conspirator implicated her in a drug scheme.138 The
Court ruled that the suspect’s waiver was voluntary because her will and
capacity for independent judgement were not overcome even by the officers’ misrepresentations.139
It is clear from the cases above that while Miranda was decided in
order to protect against the police and the inherently coercive environment
of interrogations, it has failed to do so because of the number of loopholes
created within the decision itself and by post-Miranda cases in the years
that followed.
IV. ADDRESSING THE ALTERNATIVES TO MIRANDA AND RETURNING TO
ESCOBEDO
Commentators from both sides of the issue have argued for decades
since Miranda that its doctrine is ineffective. As a result, many alternatives
have been suggested. Some commentators have attempted to create rules
guaranteeing that suspects would not be subject to a coercive environment,
and some think the entire system of police interrogation is flawed and thus
propose to restructure the criminal justice system. None of the proposed
alternatives are satisfactory in preventing false confessions under Miranda
in the current American criminal justice system. In particular, this Part of
the Comment addresses the different proposed alternatives to Miranda and
how the Court refuses to fix it. Then, this Part will propose a new alternative to the Miranda doctrine in its conclusion.
A. Alternatives to Miranda and the Court’s Refusal to Fix It
The Court’s decision in Miranda was met with criticism from both law
enforcement and attorneys alike. Both thought that the requirements created by the decision would seriously affect their investigation efforts and
ability to solve crimes. In light of this, just two years after Miranda was
decided, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as part of the Omnibus Crime

138. United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1079 (3d Cir. 1989).
139. Id. at 1089.
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Control Act of 1968.140 Congress designed § 3501 to replace the Miranda
doctrine in federal prosecutions:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District
of Columbia, a confession, . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily
made it shall be admitted in evidence.141

The factors referred to in the statute are a combination of the pre-Miranda voluntariness test standards and some of the warnings created by Miranda. The five factors set forth in the statute are: (1) the amount of time
between arrest and arraignment of defendant; (2) whether the defendant
knew the nature of the offense against him; (3) whether the defendant was
advised that he was not required to make a statement, and if he did, it could
be used against him in court; (4) whether the defendant was told of his right
to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether the defendant was without assistance of counsel when he was questioned and when he made incriminating statements or gave a confession.142 The statute does not make it mandatory that all of the standards be present for it to be conclusive as to
whether the statement was voluntary or not. The different factors were to
be considered by a judge.143
Section 3501 came before the Court for the first time in United States
v. Dickerson after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld § 3501, saying that it was the standard governing the admissibility of confessions in
federal court and not Miranda.144 The Court overruled the Fourth Circuit’s
decision and stated that the Miranda doctrine must protect the Fifth Amendment right of all suspects in custodial interrogations.145 Overall the Court
held that the Miranda doctrine was a constitutional requirement and that the
language used in the opinion indicated that the Warren Court believed that
it was “announcing a constitutional rule.”146 The Court also dismissed the
argument that the Court’s willingness to limit protections created by

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

18 U.S.C. § 3501.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
Id.
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999).
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
Id. at 439.
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post-Miranda cases proves that it is not a constitutional requirement.147 The
Court’s reluctance to overrule Miranda in Dickerson is very clear. The
Court, in stating that Miranda is a constitutional requirement and that no
constitutional rule is “immutable,”148 shows that even though the majority
of post-Miranda cases limit protections created, it still does not matter because the limiting of those protections shows that this “constitutional rule”
continues to change.
After Dickerson, other alternatives to Miranda have been proposed by
many scholars. One alternative that was proposed is a per se prohibition
against custodial interrogations where only non-custodial interrogation
would be permitted, and any incriminating statement made by a suspect
during questioning would be admissible in court.149 This rule aims to do
what the Warren Court could not, and fulfill the anti-coercion rationale in
Miranda.150 This proposed per se rule goes completely against the importance of custodial interrogation and the confessions that are obtained
during them. As such, no court is likely to accept this alternative. Even the
Miranda court did not want to impair the “traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.”151 Further, if custodial interrogations were
prohibited, police officers would just push the boundaries of non-custodial
interrogations, resulting in more interrogations where suspects are not read
their rights since Miranda only applies to custodial interrogations.
A second proposed alternative is the adoption of a per se rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities from interrogating a suspect in custody
who has not consulted with an attorney.152 Only after consulting with an
attorney, an individual who desires to make a statement may do so and it
can be used against them in court, and statements made without the assistance of counsel would be inadmissible.153 The rationale behind this alternative is that this bright-line rule would eliminate the problems associated
with Miranda by providing suspects adequate protection when subjected to
police interrogation, and it would also be a bright-line rule for the officers
when conducting the interrogation.154
147. Id. at 441.
148. Id.
149. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition
of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 75 (1989).
150. Id.
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
152. Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987).
153. Id. at 1843.
154. Id.
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While it is easy to agree with a per se replacement for Miranda, creating a non-waivable right to counsel during custodial interrogation is not
sufficient for four reasons. First, as police in the past have already shown
from the adoption of the Miranda rights, officers will find a way to push the
boundaries of non-custodial interrogation because they would become their
primary investigative source. Second, it would prevent law enforcement
officers from obtaining confession evidence altogether because any reasonable attorney will advise their client not to speak. Third, this rule would be
so broad that it would cancel non-Mirandized confessions, no matter how
credible they are. Fourth, it would be inefficient and difficult to implement
unless a police station had its own defense attorneys on site at all hours.
B. Proposal to Revert to Escobedo
After more than fifty years, it is clear that the Miranda doctrine in its
current state does not adequately protect the privilege against self-incrimination. It is naive to think that the doctrine can be tweaked by the different
alternatives or reforms that have been proposed in the past. The truth is that
the Court will continue to refuse to fix Miranda because they view it as a
constitutional requirement. Instead of trying to create an alternative to Miranda that has never been adopted by the Court, this Comment proposes a
recycled, yet refreshed, approach: reverting to the framework created in Escobedo. Escobedo ensures the right to counsel goes into effect as soon as
the police have focused their investigation on an individual and the purpose
of the investigation is to obtain a confession.155 The key aspect of the
Court’s holding is the automatic appointment of counsel regardless of an
explicit request by the suspect when the investigation becomes accusatory.
Under the current Miranda framework, almost eighty-four percent of
suspects waive their rights at the outset of custodial interrogation.156 The
number of waivers and the chance to elicit incriminating statements or false
confessions would be reduced if a suspect was presented with a per se,
non-waivable right to counsel after they speak with an attorney. While the
framework created in Escobedo is good, it can, and should, be extended.
Along the lines of the other proposed alternatives, simply reverting to Escobedo and requiring a non-waivable right to counsel once a suspect has
been taken into custody and police begin to carry out a process of investigations is not enough. Police will turn to non-custodial interrogations as
they would any other proposed alternative and take advantage of that situation.
155. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964).
156. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 121, at 860.
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This Comment proposes to extend the Escobedo framework to
non-custodial interrogations to prevent false confessions and incriminating
statements. For example, if the police were to bring someone in for general
questioning, or if an individual voluntarily came to the station for questioning, the person should be informed of their rights from the outset, and instead of the non-waivable right to counsel attaching when the investigation
became accusatory, they would have that right from the beginning. Upon
arriving at the station, before police are allowed to speak to the individual,
he or she would be able to speak with counsel and be informed of their rights
and may choose to answer questions with an attorney present or decline to
do so.
The key to protecting a person’s life, liberty, and right against self-incrimination is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.157 The coercive nature of custodial interrogation, and even non-custodial interrogation, leads
innocent individuals to falsely confess if there is no lawyer present to help
them understand their rights. As the Court in Escobedo stated, “[t]here is
necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the
police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the
accused in his need for legal advice.”158 Those who do not comprehend
their rights are in critical need of an attorney at the outset of any type of
interrogation.159 The Court in Powell acknowledges this problem:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad . . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him.160

Moreover, extending Escobedo’s counsel requirement to non-custodial
interrogations will have the ability to fulfill the anti-coercion rationale announced by the Court in Miranda. It will also protect individuals against
the psychological trickery and tactics that officers have utilized to bypass
157. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (“[The assistance of counsel] is
one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938))).
158. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488.
159. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470–71 (1966) (“The accused who does not
know his rights . . . may be the person who most needs counsel.”).
160. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol44/iss1/6

24

Amsbaugh: The Return to and Expansion of <em>Escobedo</em>

2021]

THE RETURN TO AND EXPANSION OF ESCOBEDO

161

constitutional protections in the past. Lastly, it will get rid of the objective
test of whether someone is in custody or not, making the justice system
more efficient.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Escobedo was predictive when it said that, “a system of
criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will,
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system
which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.”161 It is clear today, in the post-Miranda world, that our system of criminal law enforcement has come to depend on the confession and
it has become less reliable based on the high number of exonerees who were
convicted solely on the false confessions they gave during interrogation.
Under the proposed Escobedo approach, individuals like Karen Boes would
not be sitting in prison today. As soon as Karen arrived at the police station
to answer officer’s questions, she would have been appointed an attorney
who would have informed her of her rights, and if she would choose to sit
with an attorney during questions, officers would never have subjected her
to a twelve-hour interrogation. The officers never would have been able to
lie to her about the evidence they had against her linking her to the crime or
give scenarios and lead her into answers. She would have never been worn
down mentally and emotionally to the point where she started to second
guess her memory and think, that in some crazed state, she killed her daughter.
“No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise,
these rights.”162 A criminal justice system that depends heavily on confessions is not an even-handed justice system: “If the exercise of constitutional
rights will thwart the effectiveness . . . of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system.”163 Depending on a confession
leads to lazy investigative work and puts innocent people behind bars. It
costs the government money in the long run when it has to pay an exoneree
who files a lawsuit. It is an inefficient system that costs people their lives.
This proposed approach will be good not only for individuals who are summoned for police questioning, but the entire justice system, as it will become
more reliable, efficient, and just.

161. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488–89 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. (footnote omitted).
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